Holy Week: The Unjust Trial of the Sanhedrin

Christ Before the Sanhedrin, Gandolfino da Roreto

The trial of Jesus Christ has been characterized as a miscarriage of justice for its failures abide by Jewish law. This is an assertion I've heard many times, but have never examined in great depth. I couldn't have even told you what texts to examine for the claims behind it before today. In examining Biblical reference sources, I've learned that the laws of the Sanhedrin make up a section of the Mishna. Reading Mishna Sanhedrin presents the legal standards by which the trial of Jesus, as presented in the gospels, can be better understood and judged for its legality.

I began my reading in sections 4 and 5, which outline legal standards for two types of cases: monetary and death penalty cases. It compares and contrasts them to differentiate the increased demands of capital punishment trials. And one of the first statements in section 4 references Leviticus 24:22.

22 Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country: for I am the Lord your God.

There is one legal standard by which Jewish law judges all people, whether Jew or Gentile. To hold anyone to a different legal standard based on a lack of Jewish affiliation, actual or perceived, is a violation of due process under Jewish law. Before we examine anything else, we should have this firmly in mind: Jesus of Nazareth was entitled to all of the legal protections provided by Jewish law, regardless of how much his beliefs and behavior deviated from Jewish norms.

Let's outline the relevant legal standards presented for a capital case in the Mishna Sanhedrin. I was going to limit my analysis to sections 4 and 5 as they relate to capital punishment, but to truly understand the breadth and depth of the illegality of this trial, it's necessary to examine all of relevant portions from all 11 sections. The more I read, the more issues I found. There are additional items that are specifically relevant to this case, so I've included those as well.

I'm providing the exact text as it appears in the English translation on Sefaria, but the link above provides English and the original Hebrew. 

Section 1

Cases of capital law are judged by twenty-three judges.

The court judges cases involving an entire tribe that sinned, or a false prophet (see Deuteronomy 18:20–22), or a High Priest who transgressed a prohibition that carries a possible death sentence, only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin.

One who loves or one who hates one of the litigants is also disqualified. With regard to one who loves one of the litigants, this is referring to his groomsman. One who hates is referring to anyone who, out of enmity, did not speak with the litigant for three days. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The Jewish people are not suspected of bearing false witness due to love or hate.

Section 4

In cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but it does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable.

The court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable.

In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable.

In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable.

In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable.

In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. Therefore, since capital cases might continue for two days, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.

In cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side, where the least significant judges sit. 

Not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood are fit to judge cases of capital law.

Two judges’ scribes stand before the court, one on the right and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who find the accused liable and the statements of those who acquit the accused. Rabbi Yehuda says: There were three scribes. One writes only the statements of those who acquit the accused, one writes only the statements of those who find him liable, and the third writes both the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable, so that if there is uncertainty concerning the precise wording that one of the scribes writes, it can be compared to the words of the third scribe.Three rows of Torah scholars sit before the judges, and each and every one among those sitting recognizes his place, i.e., they are seated in accordance with their stature.

How does the court intimidate the witnesses in giving testimony for cases of capital law? They would bring the witnesses in and intimidate them by saying to them: Perhaps what you say in your testimony is based on conjecture, or perhaps it is based on a rumor, perhaps it is testimony based on hearsay, e.g., you heard a witness testify to this in a different court, or perhaps it is based on the statement of a trusted person. Perhaps you do not know that ultimately we examine you with inquiry and interrogation, and if you are lying, your lie will be discovered... In cases of capital law, if one testifies falsely, the blood of the accused and the blood of his offspring that he did not merit to produce are ascribed to the witness’s testimony until eternity. The proof for this is as we found with Cain, who killed his brother, as it is stated concerning him: “The voice of your brother’s blood [demei] cries out to Me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10). The verse does not state: Your brother’s blood [dam], in the singular, but rather: “Your brother’s blood [demei],” in the plural. This serves to teach that the loss of both his brother’s blood and the blood of his brother’s offspring are ascribed to Cain. The mishna notes: Alternatively, the phrase “your brother’s blood [demei],” written in the plural, teaches that that his blood was not gathered in one place but was splattered on the trees and on the stones. The court tells the witnesses: Therefore, Adam the first man was created alone, to teach you that with regard to anyone who destroys one soul from the Jewish people, i.e., kills one Jew, the verse ascribes him blame as if he destroyed an entire world, as Adam was one person, from whom the population of an entire world came forth. And conversely, anyone who sustains one soul from the Jewish people, the verse ascribes him credit as if he sustained an entire world.

Section 5

The court would examine the witnesses in capital cases with seven interrogations, i.e., interrogatory questions, and they are: In which seven-year period, that is, in which cycle of seven years within a jubilee did the event occur; in which year of the Sabbatical cycle did the event occur; in which month did the event occur; on which day of the month did the event occur; on which day of the week did the event occur; at which hour did the event occur; and in what place did the event occur. Rabbi Yosei says: The court would examine the witnesses with only three interrogations: On which day did the event occur, at which hour, and in what place. They would also ask: Do you recognize him as the man who committed the transgression? Did you warn him? They would then ask the witnesses about the particulars of the incident. For example, in the case of one who is an accused idol worshipper, they ask the witnesses: Whom, i.e., which idol, did he worship, and in what manner did he worship it, and so on.

And afterward, after the court examines the first witness, they bring in the second witness and examine him. If the statements of the witnesses are found to be congruent, the court begins to deliberate the matter. They open the deliberations with an appeal to anyone who can find a reason to acquit the accused.

If a majority does not find it fit to acquit him, they delay his verdict to the following day, and they then assign pairs of judges to discuss the matter with each other. They would minimize their food intake and they would not drink wine all day. And they would deliberate all night, and the following day they would arise early and come to court and then vote again and tally the votes of the judges. One who yesterday was of the opinion to acquit the defendant says: I said to acquit, and I acquit in my place, i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. And one who yesterday was of the opinion to deem him liable says: I said to deem him liable, and I deem him liable in my place. One who yesterday taught a reason to deem him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who yesterday taught a reason to acquit may not then teach a reason to deem him liable. If they erred in the matter, as one of the judges forgot what he had said the previous day, two judges’ scribes, who recorded the statements of the judges, remind him. If the court then found it fit to acquit him unanimously, they excuse him, and if not all of the judges determine to acquit, they stand to count the vote. If twelve judges vote to acquit him and eleven judges deem him liable, he is acquitted. The mishna continues: In a case where twelve judges deem him liable and eleven judges acquit; or even if eleven judges acquit and eleven deem him liable and one judge says: I do not know; or even if twenty-two judges acquit or deem him liable and one judge says: I do not know, the judge who said he does not know is disregarded, and the judges add additional judges to the court until they reach a definitive ruling. And how many judges do they add? They add pairs of two judges each time they do not reach a ruling until there are seventy-one judges, but no more than that. At that point, if thirty-six judges acquit and thirty-five judges deem him liable, he is acquitted. If thirty-six judges deem him liable and thirty-five judges acquit, they continue to deliberate the matter, these judges against those judges, until one of those who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those who acquit and changes his position, as the court does not condemn a defendant to death by a majority of one judge.

Section 7

One who blasphemes, i.e., one who curses God, is not liable unless he utters the name of God and curses it. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said: On every day of a blasphemer’s trial, when the judges judge the witnesses, i.e., interrogate the witnesses, they ask the witnesses to use an appellation for the name of God, so that they do not utter a curse of God’s name. Specifically, the witnesses would say: Let Yosei smite Yosei, as the name Yosei has four letters in Hebrew, as does the Tetragrammaton. When the judgment is over, and the court votes to deem the defendant guilty, they do not sentence him to death based on the testimony of the witnesses in which they used an appellation for the name of God, without having ever heard the exact wording of the curse. Rather, they remove all the people who are not required to be there from the court, so that the curse is not heard publicly, and the judges interrogate the eldest of the witnesses, and say to him: Say what you heard explicitly. And he says exactly what he heard. And the judges stand on their feet and make a tear in their garments, as an act of mourning for the desecration of the honor of God. And they do not ever fully stitch it back together again. And the second witness says: I too heard as he did, but he does not repeat the curse explicitly. And the third witness, in the event that there is one, says: I too heard as he did. In this manner, the repetition of the invective sentence is limited to what is absolutely necessary.

Section 11

The false prophet mentioned in the Torah includes one who prophesies that which he did not hear from God and one who prophesies that which was not said to him, even if it was said to another prophet. In those cases, his execution is at the hand of man, through strangulation imposed by the court. But with regard to one who suppresses his prophecy because he does not want to share it with the public, and one who contemptuously forgoes the statement of a prophet and refuses to heed it, and a prophet who violated his own statement and failed to perform that which he was commanded to do, his death is at the hand of Heaven, as it is stated: “And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall not hearken unto My words that he shall speak in My name, I will exact it of him” (Deuteronomy 18:19).

The chronology of the Sanhedrin's trial is interspersed throughout the gospels. By piecing these details together, we know Jesus was taken first to Annas, then to Caiaphas, before being delivered to Rome. These are the only two venues in which a trial for Jesus of Nazareth would've been performed by the Sanhedrin before he was executed. 

Annas was the former High Priest. This interaction is given in John 18, and the only thing we know about it is that he had Jesus bound and sent to Caiaphas. What this suggests to me is that Annas was the one who orchestrated the plot with Judas Iscariot for the capture of Jesus. There's no question of whether Annas acted alone, as we know from what follows that he did not. But to be brought to Annas, whose time in leadership had come and gone, only makes sense if his role in the conspiracy is to bankroll the capture and delivery of Jesus to the Sanhedrin. He needed to see that the bounty he was offering would produce the desired results before paying out.

When Jesus was taken to Caiaphas, the current High Priest, his trial before the Sanhedrin begins in his home. We'll look at the elements of the trial against Jewish legal standards and judge the Sanhedrin for their compliance with their own laws.

To begin, death penalty cases under Jewish law cannot open on a presumption of guilt. There must be a case to acquit the accused, properly explored and represented, and it must be the first thing presented in the trial. We see no such position being presented. Jesus of Nazareth enters the trial with a presumption of guilt on the part of the judges. Unanimous support from those present for a guilty verdict in capital cases is against Jewish law. Nevertheless, these violations are the the first pieces of information we gain about the trial from Matthew 26. "All the council" refers to the entire Great Sanhedrin, and they've assembled together having already decided they're going to put Jesus to death.

57 And they that had laid hold on Jesus led him away to Caiaphas the high priest, where the scribes and the elders were assembled.

58 But Peter followed him afar off unto the high priest’s palace, and went in, and sat with the servants, to see the end.

59 Now the chief priests, and elders, and all the council, sought false witness against Jesus, to put him to death;

Matthew 26 emphasizes that the entire council was present because this indicates that the trial of Jesus of Nazareth was not a standard death penalty case, but one specifically against a false prophet. This automatically triggers a trial with all seventy one judges, rather than the standard twenty three. Being a false prophet is the charge they seek to bring against Jesus. Remember this, because it's going to change before we're done.

To hold a trial against a false prophet, there are very clear legal definitions for what this means and how such a charge is meant to be investigated. Let's review Deuteronomy 19-22 because they're cited in the Mishna.

18 I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth; and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him.

19 And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him.

20 But the prophet, which shall presume to speak a word in my name, which I have not commanded him to speak, or that shall speak in the name of other gods, even that prophet shall die.

21 And if thou say in thine heart, How shall we know the word which the Lord hath not spoken?

22 When a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously: thou shalt not be afraid of him.

So to prove someone a false prophet under Jewish law, we must present witnesses who heard a prophecy that didn't come to pass, or a prophecy in the name of a false god. Presenting viable witnesses for failed prophecies is what Caiaphas and his supporters attempt to do, but it proves more of a challenge than they bargained for. How do you present at least two witnesses to prove something didn't happen? We see how they attempt to do it in Matthew 26:

59 Now the chief priests, and elders, and all the council, sought false witness against Jesus, to put him to death;

60 But found none: yea, though many false witnesses came, yet found they none. At the last came two false witnesses,

61 And said, This fellow said, I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to build it in three days. 

62 And the high priest arose, and said unto him, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these witness against thee?

John 2 addresses this story, recounting the words of Jesus to the Jews who asked him for a sign to prove he was actually doing miracles. In response he said, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." But even with the version of the story the witnesses present, these are tenuous grounds for proving a false prophecy for two reasons. 

The first reason is that no exact date is provided by the witnesses of when Jesus claimed he would destroy or rebuild the temple, making the alleged prophecy improvable. There is a second method by which Caiaphas could succeed in manufacturing evidence of Jesus as a false prophet, and it would be if he could convince Jesus to give false prophecy in front of everyone at the trial. He could attempt to twist the Savior's words into prophecy about a foreign god. But Jesus doesn't say anything that Caiaphas can use against him and that possibility goes out the window.

The second issue is that if anyone can testify to what Jesus actually said, it would sow doubt amongst the Sanhedrin. If they don't reach a majority plus two judges, Jesus will be acquitted. Caiaphas needs the entirety of the Sanhedrin because he knows there are supporters of Jesus among their numbers. And it doesn't seem to occur to him until the trial is happening that his efforts would fall apart under the weight of obviously false witnesses. 

What's supposed to happen when a trial encounters false witnesses? And how are witnesses determined to be false under Jewish law? There is a legal standard for this in Deuteronomy 19.

15 One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth: at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be established.

16 If a false witness rise up against any man to testify against him that which is wrong;

17 Then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord, before the priests and the judges, which shall be in those days;

18 And the judges shall make diligent inquisition: and, behold, if the witness be a false witness, and hath testified falsely against his brother;

19 Then shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to have done unto his brother: so shalt thou put the evil away from among you.

Diligent inquisition was required for every false witness during Jesus' trial, especially when their testimonies contradicted each other during the trial. It was the responsibility of the Sanhedrin to investigate and determine the truth and hold false witnesses to account. The Mishna attempts to enforce this diligent inquisition before the trial even starts with seven interrogations for each witness. Clearly, Caiaphas wasn't interested in doing that. He needed two witnesses to testify to Jesus being a false prophet. They're not good witnesses, but they're all he's got. If he can move faster than anyone with the will to object, the demands of the law are simply hurdles for him to overcome.

But the law presents him with another challenge even when he gets his two witnesses: when there is congruency found in witness testimonies, even when it's forced, it's supposed to trigger automatic deliberation on the question of acquittal for the accused. There are multiple fail-safes built into this process to prevent someone from going all the way to a verdict without a defense. Caiaphas is determined to blow right through them, come hell or high water. That much becomes apparent with his next move to derail any effort to save Jesus.

It's at this moment that the High Priest changes tactics and begins trying to ensnare Jesus into blasphemy. Blasphemy is a standard capital law case only requiring twenty three judges, but Caiaphas doesn't care. So even though the trial was convened on a charge of Jesus being a false prophet and the proper course of action was for adjudication to begin with the lowest ranking judges first, the High Priest takes control of the proceedings.

63 But Jesus held his peace. And the high priest answered and said unto him, I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God.

64 Jesus saith unto him, Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.

65 Then the high priest rent his clothes, saying, He hath spoken blasphemy; what further need have we of witnesses? behold, now ye have heard his blasphemy.

66 What think ye? They answered and said, He is guilty of death.

In a trial for blasphemy, Jewish law dictates what the process is supposed to look like. No one can be put to death under Jewish law for blasphemy until he is heard to utter the name of God and to curse it. The need to hear the exact phrasing is a legal requirement, to the point where an elaborate process by which these things are handled has been established. The witnesses of blasphemy use an approximation for the divine name in court to give their testimony. Then judgement is given based on the testimony of these witnesses. After judgement is given, a designated witness must repeat the exact blasphemous phrase to the judges with no other spectators in the room. Then the judges tear their robes, and all the other witnesses have to testify that the exact phrasing the first witness gives is what they heard.

Caiaphas tears his robes before the judgement has taken place, forcing the rest of the Sanhedrin to either agree with him without any witnesses for blasphemy, or to defy him openly. The statement from Christ that is supposed to have been blasphemous doesn't even meet the legal requirements for blasphemy, but that doesn't matter to Caiaphas. He wants a guilty verdict and he will break every law of God and man to get one if that's what it takes.

This trial takes place at night during the Passover, both of which were illegal. A guilty verdict was also given in the same day as the trial, which also wasn't legal. But given that it was a member of the Sanhedrin who provided Judas with a bribe to entrap Jesus for this trial, it's obvious that performing a valid trail was not the point. The elimination of Jesus of Nazareth required a deliberate and flagrant denial of the law, and that's what this trial represents from start to finish.

As in so many miscarriages of justice that continue in our day, laws don't matter when the cruelty is the point.